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Os relatórios recentes do Banco Mundial apontam para uma sensível redução na 
pobreza em escala mundial, representando não somente um recuo na incidência relativa 
da pobreza, mas também em uma significativa redução no número total de pessoas 
pobres. Entretanto, na América Latina, a incidência da pobreza permaneceu relativamente 
constante, enquanto que o número de pessoas pobres aumentou. Por causa disso, torna-se 
importante o entendimento de por que a América Latina não está seguindo o mesmo 
caminho do resto do mundo em termos de redução da pobreza. É também necessário 
compreender como os países da América Latina podem atingir um desenvolvimento 
econômico de longo-prazo, para reduzir a pobreza e melhorar a distribuição de renda. 
Dado que o desenvolvimento econômico de longo-prazo é um fenômeno complexo, o 
artigo foca no conceito dos três determinantes profundos: geografia, integração e 
instituições. Tradicionalmente, autores que estudam o impacto das instituições, 
integração e geografia na renda per capita utilizam dados de cross-section. 
Contrariamente, o presente artigo aplica o método Hausman e Taylor (1981) de dados de 
painel para examinar a influência desses três determinantes na renda per capita dos países 
da América Latina. Esse método econométrico permite considerar o problema da 
heterogeneidade, bem como estimar de uma forma direta os parâmetros das variáveis 
independentes que permanecem constantes ao longo do tempo,  como é o caso dos dados 
geográficos e algumas mensurações de instituições. Nossos resultados demonstram que 
tanto a qualidade das instituições, como aponta a literatura atual sobre o assunto, quanto 
os termos de troca afetam positivamente a renda per capita. Quando controlado o efeito 
das instituições, as mensurações geográficas apresentam um efeito positivo no entanto 
fraco, bem como a abertura comercial apresenta um efeito negativo na renda per capita. 
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  1Abstract 
 
Recent World Bank reports indicate that the world has seen a severe reduction in poverty, 
representing not just a cutback in the relative incidence of poverty but a significant 
decline in the total number of “poor” people. However in Latin America, the incidence of 
poverty has remained approximately constant, while the number of poor people has 
increased. Because of this it is important to understand why Latin America is not making 
the same strides that the rest of the world is in terms of poverty reduction.  It is also 
necessary to understand how Latin American countries can achieve a long-term economic 
development to both reduce poverty and improve income inequality. Since long-term 
economic development is a complex phenomenon, the paper focuses on three “deep” 
determinants: geography, integration, and institutions. Traditionally, authors study the 
impact of institutions, integration and geography on per capita income using worldwide 
cross-section data. Conversely, this paper employs the Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
method to examine the influence of these three determinants on per capita income in 
Latin American countries. That longitudinal econometric method allows us to consider 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries and to obtain direct parameter estimates of the 
time invariant independent variables, like geography or some institutional measures. Our 
results demonstrate that not just the quality of institutions, as much of the previous 
literature has claimed, but also the terms of trade both have strong impacts on per capita 
income. Once institutions are controlled for, measures of geography have relatively weak 
direct effects on incomes. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, we find that  
both openness to trade and appreciated real exchange rates are detrimental to growth. 
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The central economic contradiction today is that “economic development” is 
working while “development policy” is not. On the one hand, the last quarter century has 
witnessed a tremendous and historically unprecedented improvement in the material 
conditions of hundreds of millions of people living in some of the poorest parts of the 
world. On the other hand, development policy as it is commonly understood and 
advocated by influential multilateral organizations, aid agencies, Northern academics, 
and Northern-trained technocrats has largely failed to live up to its promise. We are faced 
with the confluence of two seemingly contradictory trends. (Rodrik, 2007) 
  According to the latest World Bank estimates, there were roughly 400 million 
fewer “poor” people in the world in 2001 than two decades earlier, when poverty is 
measured in the world dollar-a-day standard. This is a striking improvement in the 
absolute number of poor, not just in the relative incidence of poverty. What has made 
these gains possible is the sharp increase in economic growth in some of the poorest and 
most populous countries of the world, China and India in particular. China’s growth rate 
since 1978 has been nothing short of spectacular, binging considerable poverty reduction 
in its wake. In fact, the reduction in poverty in China alone accounts for the full 400 
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other out. The number of people below the one-dollar-a-day line has fallen somewhat in 
South Asia, but increased sharply in sub-Saharan Africa. In Latin America, the incidence 
of poverty has remained roughly constant, while the number of poor people has 
increased. (Rodrik, 2007) 
  The perseverance of disparities in income levels between rich and poor countries 
is a matter of concern worldwide, and the issue of what determinants matter most for 
development has been at the core of a large number of studies in the growth and 
development literature.  Although it remains an open question what exactly constitutes a 
“deeper” determinant of development, three broad categories have emerged in the 
literature: geography, institutions, and integration (Rodrik 2002).  It is the goal of this 
paper to understand which of these determinants has the greatest impact on Latin 
American economic development. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONS, TERMS OF TRADE, AND GEOGRAPHY 
The importance of institutions was emphasized in the work of Douglas North 
(1993, 1994a, b, c). The motivation to consider institutions can be linked to the inability 
of the neoclassical theory to explain widespread differences in economic performances 
across counties. Institutions are the rules of game that a society lays down for itself and 
which determine the incentives people face and thus the choices they make. Another way 
of looking at institutions is through their impact on transaction costs. Well defined rules 
and their smooth enforcement, i.e. better institutional quality, greatly reduce transaction 
costs economic agents face and thus lead to outcomes that are more efficient (North, 
1993, 1994b). Hall and Jones (1999) was one of the first empirical studies to examine the 
impact of institutions on economic development. Unlike geography however, there is a 
potential problem with institutions – endogeneity. Hall and Jones use a measure of 
language fractionalization as an instrumental variable for institutions, and find that 
institutions play an important role in explaining economic growth. The search for 
appropriate instruments for institutions was pushed further by Acemoglu et al. (2001).  
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) (AJR) use settler mortality as an 
instrumental variable for institutions, arguing that areas with high mortality rates are 
unable to create stable institutional structures.  They find that differences in institutions 
explain three-quarters of the per capita income differences across colonies. AJR’s 
approach uses a unique instrumental variable called settler mortality.  This is used as an 
instrument for institutional measures or institutional quality, which each have major 
endogeneity issues.  Settler mortality is now commonly used in regression analysis as an 
instrument for institutions, and will be used in this paper.  This unique approach has led 
researchers such as Rodrik (2004) to question the use and accuracy of instrumental 
variables in explaining institutions.  Despite some theoretical issues, instrumental 
variables are a viable option for overcoming the endogeneity problems that plague this 
literature.   
Rodrik (2002), who has done significant work in this area of research, discusses 
the role of institutions in economic development, using a cross-sectional analysis he finds 
that institutions have the strongest and most significant impact on economic growth, 
while the effect of geography is small and openness to trade is insignificant.  These 
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(2002).   
Jacob and Osang (2007) use panel data to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries. They employ the Hausman and Taylor estimator which allows them to 
obtain direct parameter estimates of the time invariant explanatory variables, eliminating 
problem of time invariance variable omission in a fixed effects model. The Hausman-
Taylor approach allows for comparisons to the cross-sectional literature. Jacob and Osang 
find that institutional measures have the strongest impact, followed by openness to trade.  
As in much of the previous literature, geography has a very small impact.   
  The argument for economic integration as a fundamental determinant of 
development is based on the gains from trade literature. Next to the classic case of 
comparative advantage gains are more modern approaches that stress the importance of 
trade in the transfer of new technologies and ideas, which in turn enhance productivity. 
Moreover, supplying to a larger international market allows higher degrees of 
specialization and thus entails productivity gains. There are many empirical studies on 
the link between international trade or integration and economic development. One of the 
more influential ones is Sachs and Warner (1995) who constructed an index of openness 
and found that greater openness leads to higher growth. As with institutions, trade 
variables are likely to be endogenous with regard to income. Frankel and Romer (1999) 
examine this issue in detail. Their predicted trade share variable is derived from a gravity 
equation, thus effectively using distance between countries as an instrumental variable. 
The findings point to a positive link between integration and income. (Jacob and Osang, 
2007) 
Geographic factors in general characterize the natural location of a nation such as 
distance from equator, access to sea, agro-climatic zone, disease environment, soil type, 
and natural resources. Measures of geography may matter for development because of its 
impact on transaction costs (Jacob and Osang, 2007). 
Using a cross-sectional approach, Jeffrey Sachs (2003) finds that geography 
rather than institutions has the strongest impact on economic growth.  Sachs critiques 
Rodrik’s use of the geography variable “distance from the equator,” and does not include 
a control for trade openness in his regressions.  The paper instead focuses on the role of a 
new malaria index called Malaria Ecology (ME), which he uses as an instrumental 
variable for geography.  Using this index he finds that countries that have a high malaria 
ecology index have a lower rate of growth.  Since malaria and climate are highly 
correlated, Sachs declares that geography has the most significant impact on economic 
growth.   
All of these studies have used large world data sets consisting of individual 
country data.  Using this type of data one can make conclusions about the generalities of 
institutions, geography, and trade.  However, every continent and every country has a 
specific institutional and geographical story that is being overlooked by these studies.  
Latin America is an area that has been the subject of development economists work for 
decades, and has a very specific story to tell.  For years the IMF and World Bank have 
offered incentives to become more open to trade.  Some economists blame the era of 
“neo-liberalism” for the slow growth in Latin America the last 20 years.  Some say that 
Latin American’s political institutions have been too volatile to fully develop institutions 
that are necessary for economic growth.  Some argue that the climate and proximity to 
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to overcome.  We will discuss these issues and develop a model to test what has had the 
biggest impact on Latin American Development, Institutions, Geography, or Openness to 
Trade?   
 
3. A BRIEF COMMENT ABOUT REFORMS AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
  Approximately two decades ago, countries in Latin America began a process of 
reforms oriented by the Washington Consensus. The term “Washington Consensus” 
served to exhibit the evidence of a paradigmatic shift in the economic policy for Latin 
America. The intellectual momentum behind the consensus view undoubtedly flowed 
from Washington, the locus of the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World Bank. Similarly important, the consensus encompassed key Latin American 
business elites and functionaries of the state apparatuses. Multinational corporations, 
particularly in the financial realm, used their extensive influence to consolidate a policy 
that promised to unlock all sectors of the Latin American economies to foreign 
investment and unrestrained financial flows across the borders, including fluid 
repatriation of profits.  (Cypher, 1998) 
Those earliest efforts were made at the start of the 1970s by Chile and were later 
followed by similar initiatives in Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Brazil in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The change in development paradigm, which resulted in 
the rejection of the inward oriented, state-led model of the postwar period, brought about 
great structural changes. The production structure and the institutional and regulatory 
regime of the countries of the region underwent important change as part of an 
overwhelming, long-term structural transformation. The combination of pro-competitive 
structural reforms, the historical features of each national economy and the impact of the 
world economy’s increasing financial turbulence and volatility triggered a Schumpeterian 
episode of “creative destruction” through which a new economic, institutional and 
technological regime was gradually emerging. (Katz 2001, pg. 15) 
Latin American countries suffered with the impact of a change in the 
macroeconomic incentive regime created to stabilize the economy and to introduce 
structural reforms. Such a policy package involved a drastic change in the regulatory and 
incentive regimes (including tariff protection, patent legislation, property rights on 
natural resources, etc). The central objective of the policy package-which included 
monetary, fiscal and income policies, as well as changes in the regulatory and 
institutional ‘regime’ – was that of reducing aggregate demand and imports while 
simultaneously expanding exports, together with exposing local firms to more external 
‘contestability’. (Cimoli and Katz, 2001) 
New patterns of production specialization and trade emerged, with knowledge 
intensive industries loosing ground within Latin American countries while non-tradable 
activities and natural resource processing industries and ‘maquila’ - type assembly 
operations (catering mostly for US markets), have gained participation. A gradual change 
in the technical progress and productivity growth has occurred, with a rapidly increasing 
share of external players emerging at the expense of domestic ones. Side by side with the 
development of new forms of articulation of domestic firms and consumers with foreign 
companies ‘know how’ and with the rapid diffusion of information technologies, the 
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performance. As a result, the relative technological gap with the world’s ‘best practice’ 
frontiers has become smaller in highly ‘localized’ and specific areas of each economy 
(such as telecommunication services, internet access, or energy production and 
distribution), but globally such gap remains still dramatically high, even after long years 
of trade liberalization and market deregulation efforts. (Cimoli and Katz, 2001) 
 Stiglitz  (2003)  points out that the experiment in so-called first-generation reforms 
failed in Latin America. In 2002, many of the countries of the region faced recessions, 
depressions and crises; a few of them had an almost unprecedented level, reminiscent of 
the Great Depression. Argentina, the A+ student of the first three quarters of the decade, 
has not only had a crisis but, at least in some quarters, it has become beyond measure. 
Brazil, too, a first-rate student of reform, faced a severe crisis. A reform strategy which 
promised to bring unprecedented prosperity has failed, in an almost unprecedented way. 
Its critics said that it might bring sustainable growth in the long run. The outcomes have 
been worse than many of its critics feared: it has not brought sustainable growth for the 
region but it has brought increased inequality and poverty. 
  Standard neoclassical theory predicts convergence, that is, that less developed 
countries will grow faster (per worker) than developed countries. In reality, there was 
convergence during the pre-reform decades, but since 1980 there has been divergence. In 
the early part of the 1990s, in which the success was claimed for the reforms, per capita 
income in the United States grew more rapidly than in Latin America. The counter 
argument is that it takes time for the reforms to take effect, but even this argument has a 
flaw.  It was the first half of the decade in which growth occurred. In the second half, 
especially since 1997, there has been stagnation, recession and depression. Recently, the 
growth rate in Latin America has recovered from the deep recession of the early 2000s. 
Silva and Vernengo (2007) point out that in 2005 the region grew by 4.5%, but they bring 
a serious doubt about the long-run stability of the high-level growth rate because of the 
predicted slowdown of the US economy, the largest destination of the exports from Latin 
American countries, and the remained low level of investment in infra-structure that 
would result in a ‘crowding-in’ effect.  
  Rodrik (2007) points out that an important reason why the Washington 
Consensus, and its subsequent variant, second-generation reforms, have failed to produce 
the desired outcome is that they were never targeted on what may have been the most 
important constraints blocking economic growth. The fact that poor economies are poor 
indicates that they could potentially suffer from a variety of afflictions: they are poorly 
endowed with human capital, make ineffective use of capital and other resources, have 
poor institutions, have unstable fiscal and monetary policies, provide inadequate private 
incentives for investment and technology adoption, have poor access to credit, are cut off 
from world markets, and so on. 
In fact, Latin American countries were looking for a way to restore growth and 
overcome the debt crisis that had enveloped the region. However, macroeconomic 
policies were focusing on the immediate and unique priority of stabilization. Eager to 
restore its medium-term growth prospects, Latin America made deeper changes in its 
development strategy, including proceeding with financial liberalization, opening up to 
foreign investment and trade, privatizating state-owned enterprises, and deregulating 
markets. The aim was to promote more open, competitive economies by expanding the 
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another element of strategy that – with financing support from the international financial 
institutions- would help over-indebted economies regain access to international capital 
markets. 
  A traditional import substituting industrialization (ISI) model was quite effective 
in stimulating growth in a large number of Latin American countries. East Asian-style 
outward orientation combined heavy-handed interventionism at home with single-minded 
focus on exports (South Korea, Taiwan). Chile’s post-1983 strategy was based on quite a 
different style of outward orientation, relying on large real exchange rate depreciation, 
absence of explicit industrial policies (but quite a bit of support for nontraditional exports 
in agro-industry), saving mobilization through pension privatization, and discouragement 
of short-term capital inflows. The experience of countries such as China is best described 
as two-track reform. India comes as close to genuine gradualism as one can imagine. 
Hong Kong represents probably the only case where growth has taken place without an 
active policy of crowding in private investment and entrepreneurship, but with special 
and favorable preconditions. (Rodrik, 2007) 
  In the long run, the main factor that ensures convergence with the living standards 
of advanced countries, as supported by our empirical results, is the acquisition of high-
quality institutions, and safeguarding a competitive exchange rate. The growth-spurring 
strategies described above have to be complemented over time with a cumulative process 
of institution building to ensure that growth does not run out of steam and that the 
economy remains resilient to shocks. (Rodrik, 2007) 
 
4. THE DATA, THE MODEL AND THE HAUSMAN-TAYLOR METHOD 
As discussed above, Latin America has faced various institutional and trade 
challenges that have resulted in a continent that is ripe for study and policy recipe.  In the 
development literature that focuses on “deep determinants,” perhaps the most pressing 
issue is the problem of endogeneity.  This is true for the world and true for Latin 
America.  It is possible that income per capita is affected by institutions, with political 
stability, rule of law, and property rights all instigating growth in income per capita.  But 
it is also possible that per capita income affects institutions, or that growth per capita may 
cause a demand for institutions such as property rights, political stability, and rule of law 
to be created and enforced.   
Trade/openness is also difficult to determine. Trade can affect income and 
institutions, while institutions and income can be argued to effect trade.  At the same 
time, income per capita may be both the cause and the result of an increase in trade.  The 
potential reverse causality makes this literature difficult.   
Geography may have an impact on institutions, as early settlers may have chosen 
not to settle in areas with harsh climates.  As discussed in Diamond (1997), and 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), early settlers may not have been able to grow certain crops or 
raise specific animals, which caused European settlers to “extract” resources from these 
harsher climates instead of settle and create institutions.  Geography may be the most 
exogenous variable since it is difficult to argue that institutions affect geography.  One 
could make the argument that in regards to malaria risk, which is commonly used as a 
measure of geography, institutions could affect the variable, as has certainly been the 
case in South Korea where malaria used to be a major economic burden.  However, as 
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Koreans were able to eliminate the risk of malaria.  This is a compelling argument, which 
is why the instrumental variable Malaria Ecology was developed, taking into account 
“the fact that causation may run not only from malaria to income but also from income to 
malaria” (Sachs 2003).  Generally, geography is considered exogenous, and is considered 
exogenous in Rodrik (2002), and will be considered such in this paper. The dataset covers 
the period 1996-2006 and it is based on in many sources (see table 8).    
 
4.1 HAUSMAN AND TAYLOR (1981) 
An important purpose in combining time-series and cross-section data is to 
control for individual-specific unobservable effects which may be correlated with other 
explanatory variables. An important benefit from pooling time-series and cross-section 
data is the ability to control for individual-specific effects-possibly unobservable-which 
may be correlated with other included variables in the specification of an economic 
relationship. Analysis of cross-section data alone can neither identify nor control for such 
individual effects.  The following equations illustrate:   
 
Yit  Xit  Zi i it  ( 1 )       ( i = 1,…, N; t = 1,…, T) 
 
where  and  are k and g vectors of coefficients associated with time-varying and time-
invariant observable variables respectively. The disturbance it is assumed uncorrelated 
with the columns of (X, Z, ) and has zero mean and constant variance 
2 conditional on 
Xit and Zi. The latent individual effect i is assumed to be a time-invariant random 
variable, distributed independently across individuals, with variance 
2. 
  Hausman and Taylor (1981) explain that the OLS coefficient estimates from the 
transformed data (known as "within-groups" or "fixed effects" estimators) have two 
important defects: (1) all time-invariant variables are eliminated by the transformation, so 
that y cannot be estimated; and (2) under certain circumstances, the within-groups 
estimator is not fully efficient since it ignores variation across individuals in the sample. 
The first problem is generally the more serious since in some applications, primary 
interest is attached to the unknown coefficients of the time-invariant variables. 
  The Hausman-Taylor method uses assumptions about the correlations between the 
columns of (X, Z) and i. If we are willing to assume that certain variables among the X 
and Z are uncorrelated with i, then conditions may hold such that all of the 's and 's 
may be consistently and efficiently estimated. Intuitively, the columns of  Xitwhich are 
uncorrelated with i can serve two functions because of their variation across both 
individuals and time: (i) using deviations from individual means, they produce unbiased 
estimates of the 's, and (ii) using the individual means, they provide valid instruments 
for the columns of Zi, that are correlated with i.  
  Hausman and Taylor (1981) point out from the equation (1) the properties of 
conventional estimators in the absence and presence of specification errors of the 
form E i | Xit,Zi  0. Thus 
 
Yit  Xit  Zi it (2) 
it i it 
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where they believe that  E it | Xit,Zi   E i | Xit,Zi   0. Note that, somewhat 
unconventionally,  Xit and Zi denote TN x k and TN x g matrices respectively, whose 
subscripts indicate variation over individuals (i  = 1,…, N) and time (t = 1,…, T). 
Observations are ordered first by individual and then by time, so that i and each column 
of Zi are TN vectors having blocks of T identical entries within each i = 1,..., N.  
    The prior information the Hausman-Taylor procedure uses the ability to 
distinguish columns of X and Z which are asymptotically uncorrelated with i from those 























' i hz 
 
where    of dimensions  ] [ 2 1 it it it X X X   ] [ 2 1 k TN k TN    , ] [ 2 1 i i it Z Z Z    of dimensions 
, and the  ] 2 1 g TN g   [TN k2,g2 vectors hx,   are assumed unequal to zero.  hz
  
5. RESULTS 
  In tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, we see that real exchange rate, trade openness, and rule of 
law are highly statistically significant.  The geography variables in all cases come up 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level, with only Malaria Ecology statistically 
significant within the 10% level.  This is contrary to Sachs (2003).  The institutional 
measure (rule of law) result is not surprising, however based on previous literature the 
openness to trade and real exchange rate significance are surprising.  The importance of 
the real exchange rate and openness to trade reflect the central debate that is taking place 
over the reforms in Latin America.  The high level of significance and the positive 
coefficient of the real exchange rate imply that an overvalued exchange rate is 
detrimental to Latin American growth.  This has important policy implications in terms of 
foreign capital flows, floating exchange rates, and controlling domestic interest rates.  
Similarly, trade openness is statistically significant with a negative coefficient, which 
implies that the more open to trade a country is, the lower the growth they will have.  
This is contrary to the reforms outlined in the Washington Consensus where it was 
argued that trade openness would result in a long-term and sustainable economic growth.  
This is contradictory to the results of Rodrik (2002), Jacob and Osang (2007), and 
Frankel and Romer (1999).  It is possible that in a world dataset, the specifics of the Latin 
American growth experience were lost in each of these studies.   
  In agreement with Rodrik (2002), North (1994), and Jacob and Osang (2007), 
institutions are still a dominant determinant of growth.  Rule of Law is both significant 
and has a positive coefficient.  In Latin America, we can say not just that “Institutions 
Rule,” but that both institutions and foreign trade rule.  
  It is clear to the authors that there is a very specific and important relationship 
between the real exchange rate, openness to trade, and per capita growth. In countries 
with overvalued real exchange rates, it is likely that trade openness will be detrimental to 
  9growth.  Conversely, in countries with a depreciated real exchange rate, openness to trade 
is likely to spur economic growth through export driven growth.   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
   Using panel data for Latin America, and applying the Hausman-Taylor estimator, 
we have found that both institutions and terms of trade matter in Latin America.  Many 
studies use cross sectional world datasets, which fail to capture both the time effects and 
the continent specific effects.  As Rodrik (2007) claims, there are “many recipes” for 
economic growth and economic development.  From these results, it is clear that a new 
paradigm, a paradigm different from the “Washington Consensus,” is necessary and 
should account for the area specific effects that are unique to the developing area.  In this 
case, it is clear that in Latin America, not only does the “classic” result of the importance 
of institutions hold, but terms of trade are equally as important.  The implications of the 
importance of terms of trade are that Latin American countries should have devalued 
exchange rate, and capital controls that prevent foreign capital from appreciating the 
exchange rate beyond what policy makers deem acceptable.  In terms of trade openness, 
our results imply that neo-liberal policies may be misguided for Latin America.   
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Table 1: Classification of Variables for HT Model Estimation 
Time Varying 
Institutions    Trade 
Name Category   Name  Category
Ln CMI  X1   Ln Fuel Export  X1
Rule of Law  X2   Ln Tariff  X2
Ln Infant Mortality  X2   Ln Trade Share  X2
       Ln Real Exchange Rate  X2
Time Invariant 
Institutions    Trade 
Ln Settler Mortality  Z1   Frankel-Romer Index  Z2
Ln % Protestant (80s)  Z1   Geography 
Ln % Catholic (80s)  Z1   Ln Airdist (km to closest major port)  Z1
Ln % Muslim (80s)  Z1   Ln Land Area  Z1
Ln European Fractionalization  Z1   Dist. Equator  Z1
No Corrupt  Z2   Landlocked  Z1
Political Risk  Z2   Malaria Index (1994)  Z1
    Falciparam Malaria Index (1994)  Z1
    Malaria Ecology  Z1
    Kgptemp (%Pop in temperate zones)  Z1
Note: X1 and Z1 (X2 and Z2) denote variables uncorrelated with (correlated with) the country-specific 
Time-invariant unobservables            
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Ln GDP per capita  162  7.81  0.64  6.55  9.02 
Measures of Institutions 
Rule  of  Law  162 -0.40  0.60 -1.39  1.24 
No  Corrupt  162 3.48 1.30 2.10 7.30 
Political  Risk  162 65.17  7.64 53.00 82.00 
Ln  CMI  162 4.24 0.19 3.61 4.53 
Ln Infant Mortality  162 3.05 0.42 2.08 3.95 
Ln Settler Mortality  162  4.41  0.28  4.23  5.10 
Ln % Protestant (80s)  162 0.89 0.93  -1.61 3.05 
Ln % Catholic (80s)  162  4.30  0.73  1.36  4.57 
Ln % Muslim (80s)  162  -0.90  1.34  -2.30  1.50 
Ln European Fractionalization  162 4.21 0.73 1.39 4.61 
Measures of Geography 
Ln Airdist (km to closest major  port)  162 8.45 0.41 7.79 9.05 
Ln Land Area  162  12.70  1.60  9.95  15.95 
Dist. Equator  162  0.19 0.11 0.02 0.41 
Landlocked  162 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Malaria Index (1994)  162 0.22 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Falciparam Malaria Index (1994)  162 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.26 
Malaria  Ecology  162 0.69 0.65 0.00 2.33 
Kgptemp (%Pop in temperate  zones)  162 0.14 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Measures of Openness 
Ln Fuel Export  162  1.01  2.28  -4.61  4.49 
Ln  Tariff  162 2.05 0.10 1.61 2.25 
Ln Trade Share  162  4.04  0.46  2.77  5.19 
Frankel-Romer Index  153 2.43 0.67 1.11 3.36 
Ln Real Exchange Rate  161  2.61  2.79  -3.24  10.47 
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   Panel Regressions                   
  Dependent  Variable:          
   Log Real GDP per capita  1 2  3 4 5 6 
Time Variant            
Exogenous  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.0815107   0.0783606   0.0815107  
    (5.73)***   (5.62)***   (5.74)***   
  Log CIM    0.1765273   0.062245   0.1765273 
      (0.91)   (0.32)   (0.91) 
Time Variant                      
Endogenous  Log Openness  -0.3864973 -0.2903818    -0.1911713 -0.3864973 -0.2903818 
    (4.49)*** (3.07)***    (1.91)* (4.50)***  (3.07)*** 
  Rule of Law     0.4371438  0.2917661     
            (4.82)***  (2.66)***       
Time Invariant                      
Exogenous  Distance from Equator  5.799779 2.265162  6.408788 2.312097     
    (0.80)  (1.07) (0.82)  (1.10)    
  Malaria Ecology         -1.563397  -0.4929842 
                  (0.56)  (2.00)** 
Time Invariant                      
Endogenous  NoCorruption  -0.6640636 -0.0804595  -0.9197327 -0.2045728 -1.400357  -0.0137965 
    (0.55) (0.27)  (0.71)  (0.68) (1.07) (0.07) 
  Political Risk          
            
Constant   10.38695  8.095540  9.781708 8.717610 15.10643 8.626100 
      (3.49)***  (7.34)***  (3.07)*** (7.82)***  (1.07)  (7.75)*** 
Observations    161 162  161 162 161 162 
Countries    18 18  18 18 18 18 
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.2838  0.4132  0.2307 0.2835 0.2198 0.5616 
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.7124  0.2968  0.6526 0.7178 0.6135 0.8807 
   Selected  Estimation  RE RE  RE RE RE RE 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses             
*/**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively           
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE             
‡: p values of Hausman test between HT and FE (RE and HT) if RE rejected (not rejected) in Test 1       
 
      
   Panel Regressions                   
  Dependent  Variable:          
   Log Real GDP per capita  7  8  9 10 11 12 
Time Variant            
Exogenous  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.0783606   0.0815107   0.0783606  
    (5.63)***   (5.71)***   (5.60)***   
  Log CIM    0.062245   0.1765273   0.062245 
      (0.32)   (0.91)   (0.32) 
Time Variant                      
Endogenous  Log Openness   -0.1911713  -0.3864973  -0.2903818    -0.1911713 
     (1.91)*  (4.48)***  (3.07)***   (1.91)* 
  Rule of Law  0.4371438 0.2917661      0.4371438 0.2917661 
      (4.83)*** (2.66)***         (4.80)***  (2.66)*** 
Time Invariant                      
Exogenous  Distance from Equator          
            
  Malaria Ecology  -1.573731 -0.442566  0.2047055  -0.4965415 0.6039110  -0.4767746 
      (0.50) (1.76)  (0.38)  (1.78)* (0.74)  (1.68)* 
Time Invariant                      
Endogenous  NoCorruption  -1.724701 -0.132674       
    (0.44) (0.61)       
  Political Risk     0.1043975  -0.0021326  0.1285829  -0.0205079 
       (1.38)  (0.07)  (1.14)  (0.62) 
Constant   14.86109  9.20411  2.21894 8.719530  -1.011695 10.10263 
      (0.94)  (8.10)***  (0.42) (3.95)***  (0.13)  (4.45)*** 
Observations    161 162  161 162 161 162 
Countries    18 18  18 18 18 18 
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.1475  0.4766  0.5870 0.1735 0.2926 0.1549 
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.5076  0.8321  0.9181 0.5865 0.7351 0.5290 
   Selected  Estimation  RE RE  RE RE RE RE 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses             
*/**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively           
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE   
     




   Panel Regressions                
 Dependent Variable:  Log Real GDP per capita  13 14  15 16 17 
Time Variant  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.0843592 0.0826056  0.0839310 0.0834347 0.0842919 
Exogenous    (6.22)*** (6.12)***  (6.16)*** (6.15)***  (6.22)*** 
  Log CIM  0.2003447 0.2039498  0.2015266 0.197727  0.1981438 
    (1.16) (1.18)  (1.16) (1.14)  (1.15) 
Time Variant  Log Openness  -0.2632374 -0.2641067  -0.2618940 -0.2672388 -0.2641629 
Endogenous    (2.95)*** (2.95)***  (2.91)*** (2.99)***  (2.97)*** 
  Rule of Law  0.3060437 0.3038106  0.3083485 0.3039869 0.3060603 
      (3.17)*** (3.13)***  (3.16)*** (3.14)***  (3.17)*** 
Time Invariant  Malaria Ecology  -0.491855 -0.524126  -0.295456 -0.615869  -0.4024948 
Exogenous    (1.88)* (2.14)**  (1.07) (1.80)*  (1.47) 
  Dist. Equator  2.4521610        
    (1.43)        
  Ln Land Area   .1347537       
     (1.57)       
  Landlocked     -.7145931     
       (1.32)     
  Ln Airdist       .6045312   
         (1.05)   
  Kgptemp         1.198152 
           (1.19) 
Time Invariant  NoCorruption  -0.2582666 -0.1698161  -0.2156048 -0.2834029  -0.331027 
Endogenous    (1.23) (0.95)  (1.15) (1.05)  (1.19) 
Constant   8.70708  7.16109 8.95367  4.258993  9.20779 
      (8.58)***  (4.92)***  (8.70)*** (0.99)  (7.85)*** 
Observations    161 161  161 161 161 
Countries    18 18  18 18 18 
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.0277  0.0007  0.0296 0.0012 0.0083 
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.8514  0.6064  0.7067 0.6384 0.8387 
   Selected Estimation  HT  HT   HT   HT   HT  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  */**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively   
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE 
‡: p value of Hausman test between HT and FE (RE and HT) if RE rejected (not rejected) in Test 1 
 
  15Panel 5: Regression Results:  Addition Measures of Geography 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Real GDP per capita  18 19  20 21 22  23 
Time Variant  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.0835990 0.0821253  0.0816221 0.0856739 0.0879638  0.0857635 
Exogenous    (6.14)*** (6.07)***  (6.14)***  (6.25)*** (6.48)*** (6.24)*** 
  Log CIM  0.2023263 0.2041369  0.2148261 0.1957511 0.1787533  0.1956305 
      (1.17) (1.17)  (1.24)  (1.13) (1.04) (1.12) 
Time Variant  Log Openness  -0.2638980 -0.2646397  -0.2618166 -0.2670277 -0.2667567 
-
0.2683811 
Endogenous    (2.94)*** (2.95)***  (2.92)***  (2.97)*** (2.97)*** (2.98)*** 
  Rule of Law  0.3051405 0.3033549  0.3039309 0.3045402 0.3107585  0.3039124 
      (3.14)*** (3.12)***  (3.13)***  (3.13)*** (3.20)*** (3.12)*** 
Time Invariant  Malaria Index (1994)  -.7640728 -.8558619  -1.148736       
Exogenous    (1.56) (1.92)*  (3.21)***       
  Falciparam Malaria Index (1994)       -2.738561  -4.572508  -3.774414 
         (1.11)  (3.15)***  (1.90)* 
  Dist. Equator  1.4952600     1.3430710    
    (0.87)     (0.63)    
  Ln Land Area   .0718349         
     (0.86)         
  Landlocked     -1.214913    -1.133179   
       (3.27)***    (3.15)***   
  Ln Airdist         .0399887 
                     (0.09) 
Time Invariant  NoCorruption  -0.2072144 -0.1386647  -0.1299226 -0.2028715  -.0980539  -.1853377 
Endogenous    (1.04) (0.81)  (1.04)  (0.95) (0.81) (0.85) 
Constant   8.53736  7.68543  8.71250 8.53974 8.70342  8.44485 
      (8.81)***  (5.15)***  (10.05)*** (8.79)***  (10.04)***  (2.41)*** 
Observations   161  161  161  161  161  161 
Countries   18  18  18  18  18  18 
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.0017  0.0000 0.5393  0.1451  0.9750  0.1363 
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.6412  0.4562 0.5013  0.8401  0.8455  0.8764 
   Selected Estimation  HT  HT  RE  RE  RE  RE 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  */**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively     
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE             
‡: p value of Hausman test between HT and FE (RE and HT) if RE rejected (not rejected) in Test 1         
  16Table 6:  Panel Regression Results:  Addition Measures of Institutions 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Real GDP per capita  24 25  26 27  28 
Time Variant  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.8739160 0.8739160  0.8739160 0.8739160  0.8739160 
Exogenous    (6.28)*** (6.26)***  (6.24)*** (6.26)***  (6.24)*** 
  Log CIM  0.1846400 0.1846400  0.1846400 0.1846400  0.1846400 
      (1.06) (1.06)  (1.05) (1.06)  (1.05) 
Time Variant  Log Openness  -0.2662128 -0.2662128  -0.2662128 -0.2662128  -0.2662128 
Endogenous    (2.97)*** (2.96)***  (2.95)*** (2.96)***  (2.95)*** 
  Rule of Law  0.3094180 0.3094180  0.3094180 0.3094180  0.3094180 
      (3.19)*** (3.17)***  (3.17)*** (3.18)***  (3.17)*** 
Time Invariant  Malaria Ecology  -.1192506 -.2991351  .0020716 -.2288179  -.0432057 
Exogenous    (0.33) (0.78)  (0.01) (0.61)  (0.14) 
  Ln Settler Mortality  -1.034569        
    (1.50)        
  Ln % Protestant (80s)   0.0190049       
     (0.53)       
  Ln % Catholic (80s)     -.0162675     
       (2.53)**     
  Ln % Muslim (80s)       .0757047   
         (0.43)   
  Ln European Fractionalization         1.753914 
                  (2.58)*** 
Time Invariant  NoCorruption  -0.5795053 -0.4962623  -0.4468927 -0.5258296  -.4208712 
Endogenous    (1.71)* (1.54) (1.99)* (1.48)  (1.80)* 
  Political Risk  0.1088461 0.0644900  0.0911817 0.0734023  0.0429366 
    (1.55) (1.02)  (1.82)* (1.03)  (0.96) 
Constant   7.57038  5.65990 4.97737  5.17465  5.34393 
      (2.09)**  (1.58)  (1.90)* (1.31)  (1.95)* 
Observations    161 161  161 161  161 
Countries    18 18  18 18  18 
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.3592  0.1606 0.5505  0.0169  0.4601 
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.9183  0.8619 0.9237  1.0000  0.9068 
   Selected Estimation  RE  RE  RE  HT  RE 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  */**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively   
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE, ‡: p value of Hausman test between HT and FE (RE and HT) if RE rejected (not rejected) in Test 1 
  17  18
Table 7:  Panel Regression Results:  Addition Measures of Openness 
 Dependent  Variable:         
   Log Real GDP per capita  29  30       
Time Variant  Log Real Exchange Rate  0.0815818 0.0817126     
Exogenous    (5.45)*** (6.07)***     
  Log CIM  0.2057912 0.0181122     
      (1.18)  (0.10)       
Time Variant  Log Openness  -0.2780314 -0.7877170     
Endogenous    (3.07)*** (3.58)***     
  Rule of Law  0.3251566 0.2923168     
      (3.18)***  (3.13)***       
  Ln Fuel Export  .0021816      
    (0.67)      
  Ln Tariff   .787717     
     (3.47)***     
Time Invariant  Malaria Ecology  -.3379969 -.2263013     
Exogenous     (0.98)  (0.60)       
Time Invariant  NoCorruption  -0.4085629 -0.5459781     
Endogenous    (1.40) (1.65)*     
  Political Risk  0.0448850 0.0834844     
    (0.98) (1.27)     
Constant   6.67981  3.90004     
      (2.56)  (1.06)       
Observations   161  161     
Countries   18  18     
Test 1  validity of RE†  0.0125  0.0000     
Test 2  validity of HT‡  0.9555  0.9999     
   Selected Estimation  HT  HT       
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  */**/***  significant at 10%/ 5%/ 1% respectively 
†: p values of Hausman test between RE and FE         





Table 8: Definition and Sources of the Variables 
Institutions 
Variable                       Definition and Source 








































Fraction   
 
 
Rule of law is a common institutional measure used by the World Bank.  It 
“measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  Source: World Bank   
 
Index of government corruption: Low ratings indicate “high government 
officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are 
generally expected through lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, 
policy protection, or loans.” Scale from 0 to 10. Average of the months of April 
and October in the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Source: 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). From La Porta et al. (1999) 
 
The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the 
political stability of the countries covered by International Contry Risk Guide 
(ICRG) on a comparable basis. 
 
Initially proposed by Clague (1999), it is based on a citizens decision regarding 
the form in which they chose to hold their financial assets.  It is a measure of 
the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights.  Source:  WDI 
(World Development Indicators, World Bank) 
 
Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of 
age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. 
 
An instrument developed by AJR which measures early settler mortality.  This 
instrument is based on the premise that early European colonies came in two 
forms, “extractive states (such as the Congo)” and “neo-Europes (such as 
Australia and the United States)” which directly affects the types of institutions 
that developed thereafter.  Settler mortality would explain early settlements, 
which would explain early institutions, which would then explain current 
institutions and current economic performance (AJR, pg. 2).  This data is 
mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed between the 17
th 
century and the 19
th centuries.  
 
Fraction of the population in the 1980s that is Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, or 
other religion. From La Porta et al. (1999) 
 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the four major Western European 
languages (English, French, German, Spanish and Portuguese) at birth. From 














Number of Kilometers of the capital city to the closest major port.                       
Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
 
Total square kilometers of total land area for a given country.  Source:  Frankel 
and Romer (1999).   
 
Measured by calculated the distance from the equator and dividing by 90.  
Source World Bank 2002, also Gallup et al. (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999). 
 
Dummy variable for non-Western and non-Central European landlocked 
countries. From Gallup et al. (1999)  
 





















A calculation of the proportion of each country’s population that 
lives with risk of malaria transmission.  Based on the 1994 WHO world map of 
malaria risk (1994).  Source:  Sachs (2003) 
 
An alternative measure to malaria risk, introduced in Gallup and Sachs (1998) 
which multiplies the Malaria Index (1994) by an estimate of the proportion of 
national malaria cases that involve the fatal species, Plasmodium falciparum, as 
opposed to three largely non-fatal species of the malaria pathogen (P. vivax, 
P.malariae, and P. ovale).  Source:  Sachs (2003) 
 
An ecologically based variable that is predictive of malaria risk.  It combines 
temperature, mosquito abundance, and vector specificity into a single measure.  
The underlying index is measured on a highly disaggregated sub-national level, 
and then averaged for the entire country.   
 
This variable measures the share of a country’s population in temperate 
ecozones, based on the Koeppen-Geiger ecozone classification system.  Source:  
Mellinger, Gallup, and Sachs, (2000) 
 
Terms of Trade 
Ln Fuel Exports  
 
 
Ln Tariff  
 
 










Fuel exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports.  Source:  World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Customs and other import duties (% of tax revenue). Source: World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Predicted trade shares calculated from bilateral gravity equations which control 
for geography. Source:  Frankel and Romer (1999) 
 
 
Controls for terms of trade. The real exchange rate can be defined in the long 
run as the nominal exchange rate (e) that is adjusted by the ratio of the foreign 
price level (Pf) to the domestic price level (Pd).  Rppp=e(Pf/Pd) This data was 
taken from the WDI and calculated manually.  
 
Openness index which was originally created by Sachs and Warner (1995) but 
has been updated by the World Bank.  (Exports + Imports)/GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 